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ABSTRACT 
The battlefield is constantly changing and the need for swift, persistent intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), has increased the focus on the use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) to help meet collection requirements. Certain UAVs can have 
longer dwell and on-station times than manned vehicles, with some UAVs capable of 
dwell times in excess of 20 hours. UAVs have an additional benefit of eliminating some 
of the risks associated with manned aircraft conducting ISR missions. Consequently, 
UAVs have been closely reviewed as a replacement craft for several manned ISR aircraft 
and have taken increasing roles in the world of ISR.  
Given an uneven record of success in the implementation of Unmanned Aerial 
System (UAS), and Congressional concerns regarding the relative cost of UAV 
programs, the purpose of this thesis is to reexamine, compare and analyze the Operating 
and Support (O&S) costs for both the EP-3E ISR aircraft with the Broad Area Maritime 
Surveillance (BAMS) UAS that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has declared to be 
the primary system to replace the EP-3E capability. This comparison includes all costs 
from initial system deployment through the end of the platforms’ service life. This thesis 
uses the revised O&S cost methodology in accordance with Department of Defense 
(DoD) Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. In addition, a 
typical O&S comparison, this thesis modifies the existing BAMS O&S costs to account 
for the additional costs of bandwidth, ground station support, collection sites, and risks as 
they apply to the BAMS UAS. These factors were not adequately considered in the 
original O&S analysis. Once the analysis and comparison is completed, a 
recommendation is made as to whether or not the decision to replace the EP-3E ISR 
system with the BAMS UAS should be revisited. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The need for persistent global ISR and maritime domain awareness (MDA) comes with a 
few challenges. These challenges come in the form of the use and application of UAVs to 
fill the collection gaps not currently being achieved by satellites and manned aircraft. 
UAVs present huge useful benefits to the DoD but those benefits are paralleled by costs. 
Presently, the DoD has over 6,000 UAVs in its inventory and that number is expected to 
continually increase. Congress has concerns with the rapid procurement, O&S cost and 
the management of UAVs despite the benefits they present.  
This thesis developed a revised cost-estimation in accordance with DoD 
Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, for the BAMS UAS and 
compared it to the historical O&S cost of the EP-3E provided in the Visibility and 
Management of Operational and Support Cost (VAMOSC) database. The EP-3E was 
used because it is being replaced by the BAMS UAS. In addition to O&S costs, this 
thesis implemented the additional costs of satellite bandwidth, collection site personnel, 
infrastructure redesign at the notional BAMS UAS bases and risks costs. These costs 
were implemented as Congress has voiced concern about the additional program costs not 
only for the BAMS UAS but also for the Global Hawk of which BAMS is a variant.  
The following impacts were identified. 
1) Between FY14–20, the EP-3E would cost more to operate than the BAMS 
UAS when solely analyzing the O&S costs. However, the additional costs associated with 
the BAMS UAS make the EP-3E the more efficient aircraft to operate during the period 
analyzed by $ 1.6 billion. 
2) The primary cost drivers identified between the two aircraft were personnel and 
maintenance costs. The BAM UAS squadron will have an estimated 32 percent lower 
manpower than that of a single EP-3E squadron based upon previous research conducted 
by the Orion Group. This 32 percent caused a difference of $522,043,549 between the 
two platforms between FY14–20.  
 xvi
Unit operations that include fuel cost were a major cost driver that separated the 
two systems. The BAMS UAS will maintain 24-hour global coverage that will require a 
minimum of three BAMS from each of the five notional bases to be airborne in their 
assigned operating areas at all times. Although the BAMS UAS is a single engine 
aircraft, the length of its missions and continued coverage severely increased fuel costs 
for the system. Based on the estimations calculated, the BAMS UAS unit operations cost 
exceed those of the EP-3E by $672,875,702. 
Maintenance costs were also a significant cost driver. This cost is associated with 
the age of the EP-3E as it will be in service over 40 years by FY20. The system 
components will be expected to continually deteriorate as the aircraft approaches its 
completed life cycle. The maintenance cost of the EP-3E exceeded those of the BAMS 
UAS by $555,271,135.  
Through the years compared in this thesis, the EP-3E is a more efficient platform 
to employ. The O&S costs of the BAMS UAS and the additional costs needed for the 
operation and utility of the platform exceed the costs of the EP-3E by 1.6 billion. 
Considering the current plan to reduce DoD spending over the next 10 years, Congress 
has valid concerns about the costs associated with medium to large sized UAVs and the 
BAMS UAS in particular. Additionally, the BAMS UAS program will continue to 
increase its number of BAMS until the inventory reaches 65, which will only add to the 
costs of the system based upon the cost trends identified in this thesis. The costs 
associated with the BAMS UAS program need to be revisited by Congress and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to ensure that the program does not run into future 
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Future operations will most likely see a greater reliance on UAVs. The use of 
these systems creates several challenges that current and future military leadership should 
consider. Modern warfare has caused all services to dig deep in their vaults of thought to 
find ways to meet increasingly demanding intelligence requirements. UAVs have been 
used extensively to meet these requirements. The increased application of precision 
weapons and the subsequent need for more intelligence has led to UAVs becoming more 
and more important. From kinetics to surveillance, UAVs have played more than a 
substitute or backup role and are increasingly threatening the existence of manned 
aircraft. The Air Force suggest in its Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 
that it is possible to have an entire unmanned flying force by 2047. This shift has been 
seen in naval leadership’s view of future naval ISR aircraft. In August 2011, the Navy 
announced it would replace the EP-3E, the Navy’s shore-based ISR aircraft primarily 
with the BAMS UAS. This thesis addresses an important aspect of the comparison of the 
two systems that should be reconsidered as the Navy’s leadership proceeds with the 
deployment of the BAMS UAS. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Overview 
The battlefield is constantly changing and the need for swift, persistent ISR has 
placed a focus on the use of UAVs to help meet collection requirements. UAVs have 
various dwell and on-station times with some exceeding those of manned vehicles. 
Depending on platform, some UAVs are capable of dwell times in excess of 20 hours. 
UAVs have an additional benefit of eliminating some of the risks inherent with manned 
aircraft. UAVs have been closely reviewed as a replacement craft for several manned ISR 
aircraft and have taken increasing roles in the world of ISR.  
The war on terrorism has placed a high premium on the missions and roles of 
UAVs as intelligence gatherers. “Furthermore, the military effectiveness of UAVs in 
recent conflicts such as Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003) has opened 
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the eyes of many to both the advantages and disadvantages provided by unmanned 
aircraft” (Bone & Bolkcom, 2003). All services are currently developing UAVs designed 
for specific mission sets and various roles with increasing capabilities in collection 
ability, processing and autonomy. 
In early 2011, the Navy decided that it would replace its EP-3E Airborne 
Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System (Aries) II, which is currently the Navy’s 
only land-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance aircraft, with BAMS UAS. 
The EP-3E will ultimately be retired in 2020. The EP-3Es replacement is a part of an 
eight billion dollar investment that also includes the MQ-8B Fire Scout, and the 
unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS) UAV over the 
next four years with the BAMS UAS occupying a significant portion of the investment 
(Trible, 2011). BAMS UAS is a modification of the U.S. Air Force RQ-4Q Global Hawk 
Block 10. This UAV is capable of reaching heights of 11 miles above the ground and can 
remain in flight over 24 hours. This thesis examines and compares the EP-3E aircraft 
with BAMS UAS operating and support (O&S) costs along with additional cost drivers 
that may cause concerns for Congress. It also provides information that the Navy can use 
to influence the decisions ahead in pressing forward with the replacement of the EP-3E, 
as well as figure out an alternative plan or keeping the EP-3E in service. The historical 
data for the BAMS UAS does not exist within the Navy VAMOSC database. The data 
does exist for the EP-3E that validates the exclusion of indirect cost associated with this 
cost estimate comparison. The O&S costs for the EP-3E are extended to FY20 for the 
cost estimate comparison.  
2. Congressional UAV Issues 
Today over 6,000 UAVs are in the DoD inventory, which is a dramatic difference 
from FY05 when the total DoD UAV inventory was just over 600. UAV procurement 
rates have concerned Congress for almost a decade but the pace of procurement has not 
diminished. Over a five-year span from FY00 to FY05, UAV procurement rose an 
astonishing 135 percent (Geer & Bolkcom, 2005). In FY05, the DoD spent $2.1 billion  
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on UAV procurement. “Congress’s role in UAV development has been one of strong 
encouragement tempered with concern” (Geer & Bolkcom, 2005). Procurement pace is 
one of several issues about which Congress is concerned. 
Accident rates for UAVs present a serious concern that Congress has considered 
as the size, sophistication and costs of UAVs continue to mount. As these unmanned 
systems become more complex and expensive, the tolerance for accidents and loss rates 
bring about more challenging considerations in regards to replacing lost systems. Loss 
rates are attributed to mechanical failures, landing gear malfunctions/failures, weather, 
electrical failures, engine failures and global positioning system communications loss. 
The Global Hawk has an accident rate of 9.31 accidents or every 100,000 hours, which is 
the highest rate of any aircraft in its size category (Geer & Bolkcom, 2005). No reason 
exists to suspect that the BAMS UAS, which is a Global Hawk variant, will have a lower 
accident rate as the Navy lost one of its BAMS UAS that represents one-fifth of its 
inventory, on June 11, 2012, in Dorchester County, MD (Geer & Bolkcom, 2005). At a 
cost of over $220 million a unit, coupled with the current accident rate, and the 
replacement costs associated with the system, Congress may have valid reasons for 
concern, as the loss of that one system will cost the Navy over $440 million total in 
procurement when considering the lost aircraft and its replacement. 
Bandwidth costs associated with ISR UAVs is another concern. DoD bandwidth 
requirements continue to rise as information requirements rise. The time-sensitive 
information collected by the BAMS UAS is dependent upon a high bandwidth 
environment. Each BAMS UAS will require at least 500 megabits per second (mbps), 
which is over five times greater than what all U.S. forces required during Operation 
Desert Shield/Storm. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is currently 
purchasing over 80 percent of DoD’s bandwidth from commercial satellite (COMSAT) 
providers and industry experts project that this will increase to 90 percent in the near 
future (Rosenberg, 2010). The concern for Congress is not only COMSAT cost but the 
security of the military’s critical information as the DoD becomes more reliant on 
COMSAT providers. 
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Congress continues to probe the Air Force and the Navy about costs associated 
with their most sophisticated UAVs including the Global Hawk and the BAMS UAS. The 
Global Hawk has already suffered significant setbacks that have had a direct effect on 
cost increases and Congress is concerned that the Navy may face some of the same issues 
leading forward with the BAMS UAS. This thesis revisits the O&S cost estimate of the 
BAMS UAS based on concerns that stem from Congress. Other cost concerns examined 
are increased manning costs, and the building and redesigning of ground stations 
necessary to operate the BAMS UAS that while not specifically addressed by Congress 
will be of significant concern. 
3. EP-3E History and Role 
a. EP-3E History 
First introduced in 1969, the EP-3E ARIES I specialized in tactical signal 
intelligence. The EP-3E was introduced to replace the EC-121 Super Constellation, 
which were used in World War II and the Korean War. The airframe has remained a 
relevant asset in maritime ISR due to upgrades that have enhanced collectability. The 
latest upgrade was approved in 2010 for the aircraft to receive Joint Architecture 
Modernization Common Configuration (JCC) Spiral 3. “The JCC Spiral 3 program was 
approved for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in the spring of 2011 authorizing the 
modification of three additional aircraft” (Hewitt, 2011). Full Rate Production was later 
approved later in 2011. 
The EP-3E continues to hold relevance in the fleet providing national and 
tactical intelligence against existing and emerging threats. The Navy has relied on the EP-
3E for over 40 years as it is still requested in support of intelligence needs. The airframe 
has supported NATO operations in support of the Bosnian crisis, uprisings in the Middle 
East, and it has a constant presence in the Global War on Terror. While in the mission 
area, the mission the crew fuses collected time-sensitive information providing 
indications and warning, direct threat assessment and warning, and anti-air warfare. 
The EP-3E is a proven aircraft but has been threatened with replacement 
on numerous occasions. In late 1992, the EP-3E program was threatened to be replaced 
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by the Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993). The aim was to employ 
a single joint airframe to conduct signals intelligence in an effort to cut costs. However, 
after former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell expressed the 
need for both airframes, Congress allowed the EP-3E to remain in service. General 
Powell stated, “Eliminating either type or replacing one with the other would be costly 
and would contribute nothing to effectiveness” (The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993). The 
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) was another threat to the existence of the EP-3E. Over the 
course of eight years, the Navy viewed ACS as a replacement option but the Navy 
eventually did not integrate the system.  
The EP-3E has remained in the fight and in June 2011, it received another 
upgrade to its collection system, the JCC Spiral 3 configuration. The JCC Spiral 3 has 
extended the longevity of the EP-3E by increasing its collection capabilities. It has also 
allowed it to remain relevant to battle group commanders, joint commanders and the 
Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA). 
b. EP-3 System Role 
The EP-3E, is the Navy’s shore based, long-range, ISR SIGINT aircraft. It 
is a modification of the P-3 Orion and used for near real-time SIGINT reporting in 
support of battle group commanders, joint commanders and the National Security 
Agency. “The primary mission of EP-3E is to rapidly assess the tactical situation using a 
variety of onboard sensors and remote data-links, manage this multiple-source data, 
perform contact processing and events analysis and disseminate evaluated tactical data to 
the appropriate Fleet Commanders and in theatre decision makers” (IHS Janes, 2012). 
The aircrew onboard the EP-3E consists of 24 personnel, of which seven to eight are 
officers and 16 are enlisted. The positions held onboard are comprised of pilots, naval 
flight officers, an electronic warfare (EW) mission commander, an EW aircraft 
commander, a senior evaluator, EW operators (EWOP), laboratory operators, a secure 
communications operator, special station operators, in-flight technician, and flight 
engineers. 
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The EP-3E has been used in nearly every U.S. conflict including the Cold 
War, and provided battle group commanders with relevant SIGINT. The Navy has not let 
time diminish its effectiveness as new systems have been implemented, and replacing 
others that have become obsolete. The EP-3E is operated by two squadrons, Fleet Air 
Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) and Two (VQ-2). Both squadrons have flown the 
EP-3E since 1969 and provided valuable intelligence and support during multiple 
exercises with fleet and air units. These squadrons have flown the EP-3E in support of the 
evacuation of 2000 personnel from Liberia in 1990. The EP-3E had provided timely 
intelligence during Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, PROVEN FORCE 
and PROVIDE COMFORT (Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Two VQ-2, 2011). The 
EP-3E possesses capabilities so relevant and effective that it is still flown off of the coast 
of some countries that find its presence offensive. The significance of this aircraft 
garnered world-wide attention in April 2001 when an EP-3E collided with a Chinese 
naval F-8 fighter. Since the incident, the EP-3 has played vital roles in Operations IRAQI 
FREEDOM AND ENDURING FREEDOM, and provided timely, relevant intelligence 
and indications and warning in support of ground commanders and national customers. 
c.  BAMS UAV History and Role 
According to historians, UAVs have been used in battle for over 100 
years. During the American Civil War, both sides used balloon-like explosive UAVs. 
“The idea was for the balloons to come down inside a supply or ammunition depot and 
explode” (Garamone, 2002). In World War II, the Japanese tried a similar tactic. “They 
launched balloon bombs laden with incendiary and other explosives” (Garamone, 2002). 
The idea was that easterly winds would force the balloons to the west coast of United 
States, descend and cause a multitude of forest fires in various locations. The other 
intended purpose of this tactic was to burn roadways, homes and businesses that would 
cause fear among the American people (Garamone, 2002). U.S. and Allied forces tried to 
use modified manned aircraft as UAVs but quickly realized they did not have the 
technology to control the aircraft fully so they were used as an alternative method. 
“Allied forces used the modified manned aircraft basically as cruise missiles” 
(Garamone, 2002).  
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In Vietnam, UAVs were implemented in a more sophisticated manner. 
Advances in technology allowed for completely radio controlled UAVs. The UAV of 
choice was the AQM-34 Firebee. “As a whole, Firebees flew over 3,400 sorties during 
the war” (Garamone, 2002). With an endurance of eight hours, they were originally used 
for photo operations. However, the Firebee quickly transitioned into a multi-mission 
UAV. Other missions included COMINT, ELINT, leaflet dropping and surface-to-air 
missile radar detection (Garamone, 2002). The Firebee code-named “Combat Dawn” was 
developed in the wake of the Navy’s EC-131 ISR aircraft being shot down by North 
Korea. The Firebee flew preprogrammed routes after being launched mid-air by a C-130 
and had the capability to collect and relay collected SIGINT nearly 300 miles away 
(Teledyne-Ryan AQM-34 Combat Dawn Firebee, 2011). Since then, the roles of UAVs 
have increased in military action, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. UAVs are currently 
defined by the DoD as, “a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, 
uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle life, can fly by itself (autonomously) or be 
remotely piloted, can be expendable or recoverable at the end of flight, and can carry a 
lethal or nonlethal payload” (Elmendorf, 2011). 
d. BAMS/Global Hawk History 
The BAMS UAS is a variant of the United States (U.S.) Air Force RQ-4B 
Global Hawk Block 10. After participation in several exercises from 1999 through 2002, 
Northrop Grumman delivered the first Global Hawk to the Air Force for demonstration in 
2003 (Hanlon, 2005). The Navy became interested in the Global Hawk and two were 
delivered to the Navy in 2005. The Navy’s plan was to modify the Global Hawk and 
deploy it in support of maritime surveillance. In 2008, Northrop Grumman was awarded 
a contract to build the Global Hawk variant (MQ-4C Triton (BAMS UAS), n.d.). The 
intent is to provide unparalleled maritime domain awareness, as well as deliver a 
persistent ISR capability to battle group commanders. 
e. BAMS System Role 
Lower cost was one of the main advantages that UAVs were originally 
thought to provide. Despite cost and budget increases, the DoD has shown an increase in 
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use and the development of UAVs has continually increased to include the BAMS UAS, 
which has the ability to play a vital role in the future of Navy war-fighting. The BAMS 
UAS, “will be a forward deployed, land-based, autonomously operated system that 
provides a persistent maritime ISR capability using a multi-sensor mission payload 
(maritime radar, Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR), Electronic Support Measures (ESM), 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) and basic communications relay)” (Naval Air 
Systems Command, 2012a). BAMS is designed to play a significant role in the Maritime 
Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF). “BAMS is an integrated System of Systems 
and a force multiplier for the Joint Force and Fleet Commander, enhancing battle-space 
awareness and shortening the sensor-to-shooter kill-chain” (Dishman, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1.   BAMS UAS 
The BAMS UAS has the “ability to perform persistent intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance within a range of 2,000 nautical miles” (MQ-4C Broad 
Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), 2011). Collected imagery will be fed via a satellite 
feed to a Navy ground segment. The information will provide both operation and tactical 
customers with increased battle space awareness while maintaining the common 
operational and tactical picture. BAMS is tailored for maritime ISR, which consists of the 
collection above oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands and coastal areas (Conway, 
Roughead, & Allen, 2010). Its design will allow it to provide real-time SIGINT, perform 
vital roles in strike packages and communication relays while operating either in 
conjunction with other naval assets or independently (Poston, 2011). 
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The BAMS UAS will have a complex collection and communications 
suite consisting of, “maritime SAR and Inverse SAR, Electo-optical/Infra-red 
(EO/IR)/Full Motion Video, Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), a basic communications relay capability and Link-16” 
(Oesterguard, 2012). The communications suite will support real-time data and video 
transport and give afloat staff a common operating picture. To ensure 24-hour global 
coverage, BAMS will be located at five notional bases. The proposed bases include 
Marine Corp Base Hawaii (MCBH) Kaneohe, Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville, FL, 
NAS Sigonella, Sicily, Italy, Diego Garcia, and NAS Kadena, Japan (MQ-4C Broad Area 
Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2.   The BAMS UAS Radii 
B. PURPOSE 
Given this uneven record of success, and Congressional concerns regarding the 
relative cost of UAV programs, the purpose of this thesis is to examine, compare and 
analyze the O&S costs for both the EP-3E ISR aircraft with the BAMS UAS. This 
comparison includes all costs from initial system deployment through the end of the 
platforms’ service life. This thesis uses a revised O&S cost methodology in accordance 
with DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. This thesis 
modifiese these to account for the additional costs of bandwidth, ground station support, 
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collection sites, and risks as they apply to the BAMS UAS. The original O&S analysis 
did not adequately consider these factors. Once the analysis and comparison is 
completed, the data from this thesis recommends which platform, the EP-3E or the 
BAMS UAS, is more cost effective from a sustainment perspective, and whether or not 
the decision to replace the EP-3E ISR system with the BAMS UAS should be revisited. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses the following research questions. 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the major factors driving the cost differences between the EP-3E and the 
BAMS UAS and why? 
2. Secondary Research Question 
What are the differences in the O&S cost of the EP-3E and BAMS? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
For this thesis, the EP-3E was used to compare O&S cost because it is closely 
analogous to the BAMS UAS as the unmanned system is the primary replacement for the 
EP-3E. The BAMS UAS will even utilize open architecture developed for the EP-3E 
(Fein, 2007). The EP-3E historical O&S data will be provided by the Visibility and 
Management of Operating and Support Cost databases. The research questions were also 
addressed through the review of a substantial number of publications on the EP-3E, 
BAMS UAS, DoD O&S cost procedures and processes, and satellite bandwidth. 
Additionally, conversations were held with Pentagon (J282 and N2/N6), Naval Air 
Systems Command (EP-3E/P-3 and BAMS), and VIASAT personnel.  
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis contains five chapters. 
Chapter I provides the topic, introduction, background, Congressional concerns, 
system roles, system importance, purpose and methodology. 
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Chapter II contains the baseline for the O&S cost as defined by the DoD, which 
helps understand the metrics used in the construction of this thesis. 
Chapter III explains what in the O&S comparison is actually compared as the two 
systems differ, and develops the methodology for estimating the O&S costs used for 
comparison. 
Chapter IV provides the analysis of the O&S comparison between the two 
platforms illustrated in Chapter III. 
Chapter V summarizes the analysis of the data from Chapters III and IV, reports 
conclusion and answers the thesis research question. This chapter also provides 
recommendations for further research. 
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II. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To understand the depths of the operating and support costs for the EP-3E and the 
BAMS UAS, it is essential to understand the DoD operating and support cost-estimation 
process. In accordance with DoD Manual 5000.4, DoD Cost Analysis Guidance and 
Procedures, all military departments and defense agencies are to perform O&S cost 
estimates. O&S costs are the third phase in the system life cycle process. Figure 3 depicts 
a notional life cycle process used as a baseline for military departments and defense 
agencies. 
The following items are included when developing O&S estimates (Operating and 
Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). 
 Operating Cost, Maintenance and Supported Systems 




 Operating Services 
 Modification Cost 
 Maintenance and Upgrades 
 Training 
 Any additional support cost to the DoD system 
O&S costs should be presented in an annual historical form collected through 
VAMOSC as each military department has an established VAMSOC system (Operating 
and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). 
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Figure 3.   Life Cycle Support Cost (From Operating and Support Cost-Estimation 
Guide, 2007, p. 2–1) 
The purpose of O&S cost estimates is to help leadership determine the 
affordability of the system, translate system requirements associated with programs, as 
well as determine if alternative systems or solutions are viable. O&S cost estimates are 
important to military departments because they improve the budget process providing 
data for required funding to ensure that the program is executable (Operating and Support 
Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). “Moreover, having a realistic estimate of projected cost 
make for effective resource allocation, and it increases the probability of a program’s 
success” (Richey, Echard, & Cha, 2009, p. 33). 
Military departments face challenges when developing O&S cost estimates. 
However, no process is perfect or error free and cost estimation requires analysis to 
consider multiple risks and uncertainty. Uncertainty may come from estimating the 
system performance, reliability and maintenance requirements that are critical factors. 
Other challenges include gathering enough detailed documentation and historical data, 
which increase the ability of the analysis to mend science and judgment of the cost 
estimation process. 
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Thus, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section provides an 
overview of the DoD cost estimation process to give the reader a baseline for 
understanding how cost estimation is conducted by each military department and defense 
agency. The second section provides an overview of what O&S items will be used for the 
comparison in this thesis and the assumptions made in the comparison. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE O&S COST ESTIMATION PROCESS 
The O&S cost estimation process is used to help determine the most efficient 
logistics and maintenance structure and develop methods for cost reduction. DoD 
Instruction 5000.02 states: “The purpose of Operations and Support Phase is to execute a 
support program that meets material readiness and operational support performance 
requirements, and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life 
cycle. Planning for this phase shall begin prior to program initiation and shall be 
document in the LCSP.” One of its greatest strengths is that the program starts early in 
the acquisitions process. The process also provides the cost of the system over its total 
life cycle, which is another strength. These two strengths provide a budget that drives the 
design produced by contractors, and keeps the system affordable (Taylor & Murphy, 
2012). 
The O&S cost estimation process contains four forward-looking steps: Develop 
Approach, Cost Analysis Requirement Description (CARD), Prepare Estimate and 
Coordination. Due to the complexity of the O&S estimation system, several of the steps 
are reevaluated throughout the process. Figure 4 shows the notional framework of the 
O&S Cost Estimating Process. 
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Figure 4.   O&S Cost Estimating Process (From Operating and Support Cost-
Estimation Guide, 2007, p. 5-1) 
1. Develop Approach 
Approach development requires all interested parties to conduct a well-tuned 
analysis for the development of the system. Baseline assumptions and risks should be 
established in this step. The four assumptions that are typically made during this first step 
are System Life/O&S Phasing, Year Dollars/Inflation Indices, War/Peace Conditions and 
Scope of the Estimate (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007).  
a. System Life/O&S Phasing 
The exact life expectancy of the system may vary due to newly developed 
systems, reliability, and durability during a systems life (Operating and Support Cost-
Estimation Guide, 2007). O&S cost estimates should cover the full life of the system.  
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“The O&S phasing will include a phase-in period, the period during which the system is 
in steady-state operations, and a phase-down period” (Operating and Support Cost-
Estimation Guide, 2007, pp. 5-2). 
b.  Year Dollars/Inflation Indices 
The costs presented in O&S estimation are presented in constant dollars. 
The figures are present in either fiscal or baseline year. Fiscal year O&S costs are always 
compared to the original O&S budget. “The indices used to adjust for inflation should be 
specified and documented” (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007, pp. 5-
3). 
c. War/Peace Conditions 
O&S cost normally reflect peacetime operations (Operating and Support 
Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). However, some of the cost elements may be supplied at 
wartime levels in the event that military operations are required. 
d. Scope of the Estimate 
Scope sites specific costs that are directly associated, which is necessary 
because systems often times have unique complex operating systems that require other 
systems for operation (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). 
Beyond assumptions, the content of the program should be described in 
detail. To complete the approach development step, analysts must establish the cost 
estimate structure for the program. The cost estimate specifically describes all elements 
that will be included in the O&S cost estimate (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation 
Guide, 2007). 
2.  Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) 
CARD is the required extensive data that is mandatory to complete the cost 




estimated; it is intended to define the program to a sufficient level of detail such that no 
confusion exist between the many parties who may be concerned with estimating the 
program’s cost” (Azama, 2000). 
3.  Prepare Estimate 
Selecting the proper model to estimate the costs is very important in this step. 
Choosing the incorrect model for a particular system may result in costs that incorrectly 
represent the system being described. To avoid this costly mistake, five techniques, 
parametric, analogy engineering estimate, actual cost and cost factors are used to ensure 
the most accurate cost are presented. 
a. Parametric 
Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) are developed using various 
statistical programs to include regression. “CER is an equation used to estimate a given 
cost element using an established relationship with one or more independent variables” 
(Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007, pp. 5–6). CERs must be relevant to 
the system being examined (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). 
b. Analogy 
An analogy uses a combination of historical data and a single data point 
that is accomplished by adjusting the analogous system cost (Department of Defense 
Instruction 5000.2, 2008). “Some adjustments can be made through the use of factors that 
represent differences in size performance, technology, reliability and maintainability, 
and/or complexity” (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007, pp. 5-6). 
c. Engineering Estimate 
This technique evaluates manpower, maintenance and support functions. 
The system in question is broken down by cost based on the dollar amount expended. 
This process requires detailed knowledge of the system in question, to include interfaces, 
parts and assemblies (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007).  
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d. Actual Cost 
The process includes prototypes, engineering and development costs, and 
production items. These costs are also used to determine future costs. VAMOSC is 
commonly used to gather much of this data. 
e. Cost Factors 
Cost factors usually include indirect costs associated with the system, and 
usually include base operations, military medical care or general training, and education 
(Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). Also included in these factors are 
sewage and industrial waste storage. 
Uncertainty and risks estimated in O&S cost will differ. However, this 
uncertainty should be well documented, which will allow for seamless audits. The 
documentation of cost estimates should cover all aspects involved to include methods 
used to determine the estimates, data sources, and the actual estimates computed 
(Department of Defense, 2011b). 
4. Coordination 
The O&S cost estimation process is a complex process that requires extensive 
coordination from all parties involved. The parties include program manager(s), users, 
engineers, logisticians, and financial management. Although this list is not all inclusive, 
the list represents several key entities important to providing data and advice during this 
process. Their coordination is emphasized during this process because some of the 
processes will start prior to the previous process ending causing an overlap. 
C. OVERVIEW OF OSD COST ANALYSIS IMPROVEMENT GROUP 
(CAIG) ELEMENT STRUCTURE 
The CAIG advises the Secretary of Defense and The Defense Acquisition Board 
(DAB) on all cost related matters (Azama, 2000). This CAIG also validates cost 
estimation methodology, develops cost implications for individual systems, establishes 
guidance for preparing cost estimates, and maintains a cost analysis research program 
(Azama, 2000). The DAB develops the CAIG structure. The CAIG structure consists of 
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six main categories: unit-level manpower, unit operations, maintenance, sustaining 
support, continuing system improvements, and indirect costs. Figure 5 provides a general 
description of the CAIG element structure. 
 
 
Typical System and Support Descriptions 
 
 System Characteristics 
 Performance Characteristics 
 Physical Characteristics 
 Advanced technologies/materials 
 
 Unit-Level Manpower 
 Operations 
 Unit Maintenance 
 Other Unit-Level 
 Reliability/Maintainability 
 
 Operating Concept 
 Basing and deployment 
 Inventory and OPTEMPO 
 Organizational/Unit Structure 
 
 Support Concepts 
 Maintenance levels 
 Software Support plan 
 Supply strategy 
 Training concept 
 Program Schedule 
 Delivery and site activation 
 System life/O&S phasing 
 Interim contractor support 
 Special support 
 Unique infrastructure 
 Special environmental 
 considerations  
 
Figure 5.   CAIG Element Structure (From, Operating and Support Cost-Estimation 
Guide, 2007, p. 5-4) 
1. Unit-Level Manpower 
Unit-level manpower includes operator, maintenance and support personnel to 
include active and reserve military, government civilian and contractors (Operating and 
Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007), which are a direct cost to the unit that supports 
their assigned personnel. These costs should be based on rank and grade with civilian and 
government contracts cost shown separately from military personnel. The costs for 
military personnel should include the following items: basic pay, retired pay accrual, 
basic allowance for quarters/variable housing allowance, basic allowance for 
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subsistence/subsistence-in-kind, incentive and special pays, permanent change of station, 
and miscellaneous expenses (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). 
2. Unit Operations 
Unit Operations include all cost, such as fuel, electricity, expendables stores, 
munitions for training, and other materials consumed at the unit level attributed to 
operations (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). These costs are 
separated into operating material (energy, training munitions/expendable stores, operating 
material), and support services (purchased support services and temporary duty). 
3. Maintenance 
Maintenance costs include all levels of maintenance associated with the primary 
system, simulators, training devices, and associated support equipment. These costs are 
further distinguished by organizational maintenance and support, consumables, repair 
parts, services, intermediate maintenance and depot maintenance (Operating and Support 
Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). 
4. Sustaining Support 
Sustaining support specifically applies to the costs of training incoming personnel 
who will replace personnel that have reached their rotation date. Included in these costs 
are the cost of instructors, training devices, course material, per diem, and travel. The 
major contributing factors of sustaining support costs are specific operator training, 
support equipment replacement, operating equipment replacement, engineering and 
program management, and special support costs (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation 
Guide, 2007).  
5. Continuing System Support 
Continuing support applies to software and hardware replacements, and upgrades 
that a system may undergo after deployment to enhance performance and sustainability. 
“These costs include government and contract labor, materials, and overhead costs” 
(Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007, p. 6-14). 
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6. Indirect Support 
These costs are all installation and personnel support costs that cannot fit into the 
previous five categories. These costs are separated because they are the costs that 
typically change due to the installation of a new system or equipment. They are 
particularly relevant is cases when manpower or installations are significantly affected 
(Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). 
D.  OVERVIEW OF O&S COST COMPARISON AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Introduction 
The overview of the revised O&S cost comparison will describe the costs 
compared for the analysis of this thesis, which uses five of the six CAIG element 
structure categories for this comparison. The five categories used for this thesis are unit-
level manpower, unit operations, maintenance, sustaining support, continuing system 
improvements. Indirect costs are excluded in this comparison because the BAMS UAS is 
not yet operational. Therefore, the effects that the first deployment will have on 
manpower and installation cannot be estimated. The chart includes the sub-categories of 
each of the five categories to provide a consummate level of detail. A total of 30 lines 
items are used for comparison. Table 1 provides a blank chart of the Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS) for O&S used for this comparison. These costs form the basis of 
comparison for the O&S of the EP-3E to that of BAMS.  
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Table 1.   O&S Cost Estimate Sample Chart 
2. Assumptions 
The BAMS UAS is being compared to the EP-3E because of the Navy’s decision 
to replace the EP-3E with the BAMS UAS. This comparison is also valid because like the 
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EP-3E, in accordance with the Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) concept of 
operations (CONOPS), the BAMS UAS will utilize P-3C facilities. “The program 
planned to collocate BAMS UAS mission crews with Maritime Patrol and 
Reconnaissance (MPR) Forces to allow operators to closely coordinate missions and 
utilize common support infrastructure” (MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
(BAMS), 2011). 
Specific assumptions for this comparison include the following. 
 BAMS UAS is a new system, and manning support can be expected to be 
at 100 percent with approximately 168 personnel (BAMS UAS Manning 
and Fleet Integration Strategy, 2010). The Navy has not determined if the 
BAMS UAS will be a stand-alone squadron but for this comparison, the 
cost estimates for the BAMS UAS are estimated based upon the system 
operating from a stand-alone squadron. The actual manning data from 
PMA-262 is not available due to privacy issues and program concerns. In 
accordance with the Navy Training System Plan for EP-3E Aircraft, the 
required personnel for a VQ squadron is 517 personnel (officer and 
enlisted). The ratio of 168 to 517 personnel is 32 percent. Due to this ratio, 
the manpower cost of an EP-3E squadron should be significantly higher 
than a BAMS UAS squadron.  
 Fuel costs for the BAMS UAS may exceed those of the EP-3E. Although 
the BAMS UAS uses a single engine versus four engines of the EP-3E, the 
number of BAMS required to provide coverage of a single mission area is 
three. Based on Figure 6 with the BAMS UAS operating 1500 NM away 
from its operating bases, three BAMS will be required to be in-flight at all 
times per mission area plus a standby on the ground that may drive up the 






Figure 6.   Number of Required BAMS (From Lim, 2007, p. 37) 
 The maintenance costs for EP-3E will significantly outweigh those of the 
BAMS UAS. This significant difference can be attributed to the extended 
service life of the EP-3E and the increased usage because of Operations 
IRAQI FREEDOM AND ENDURING FREEDOM. To maintain an 
aircraft that has been operational for over 30 years will require increasing 
maintenance. The BAMS UAS maintenance related costs are estimated at 
65 percent lower than that of the EP-3E.  
 Training costs are closely estimated to the cost of training EP-3E 
personnel. NAS Jacksonville will house the training facility for the BAMS 
UAS (Commander Navy Installations Command, 2012).  
 Continuing system improvements for the BAMS UAS will be estimated at 
30 percent higher than the EP-3E. The EP-3E is a retiring asset while the 
BAMS UAS is still in the acquisition cycle. As more BAMS UAS become 
operational and are successfully taking over the EP-3E mission, 
continuing system improvements will decrease. 
 The comparison will use O&S costs from the EP-3E based upon the 
average increase from FY97 to FY11 in each of the five categories. This 
calculation will be determined using the EP-3E historical data provided by 
VAMOSC database. 
 The thesis assumes the Navy will spend a comparable amount on the 
redesign of the facilities that will base the BAMS UAS. This assumption 
is based upon the current redesign that the Air Force is performing for the 
operation of its Global Hawk (Air Force Distributed Common Ground 
System, 2011).  
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 This thesis assumes the required bandwidth used by the BAMS UAS will 
be the same as the bandwidth required for the Global Hawk, as the actual 
required bandwidth required for the BAMS UAS has not been published.  
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III.  BAMS OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST ESTIMATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this comparison is to utilize the O&S WBS data from the EP-3E 
provided by Naval VAMOSC and the generated O&S cost estimation data from the 
BAMS UAS to ascertain the major O&S cost nodes. Historical O&S costs were evaluated 
for cost trend analysis but the estimated cost for the BAMS UAS will based upon FY11 
WBS O&S. DoD Instruction 5000.4, DoD Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures, 
contains the mandated procedures for developing system life cycle costs of any new 
acquisition. System life cycle costs consist of four program phases: Research and 
Development, Investment, O&S and Disposal. For the purpose of this comparison and 
analysis, O&S costs will be solely used due to release restrictions, ongoing acquisitions 
and investments processes, and the fact that neither program has reached the disposal 
phase. The additional cost factors calculated and examined are estimations based upon 
the current Air Force model. Furthermore, O&S costs typically account for virtually half 
of the overall life cycle cost for aircraft (Valerdi, n.d.). For this reason, O&S costs were 
chosen for this comparative evaluation. See Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Summary of EP-3E O&S Cost Elements and BAMS UAS Multipliers 
Tables 3 through 9 summarize the O&S cost estimates by cost element for the 
BAMS UAS from FY 2014 through FY 2020. 
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Table 3.   O&S Estimate for BAMS UAS FY14 
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Table 4.   O&S Estimate for BAMS UAS FY15 
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Table 5.   O&S Estimate for BAMS UAS FY16 
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Table 6.   O&S Estimate for BAMS UAS FY17 
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Table 7.   O&S Estimate for BAMS UAS FY18 
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Table 8.   O&S Estimate for BAMS UAS FY19 
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Table 9.   O&S Estimate for BAMS UAS FY20 
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B. ADDITIONAL COST CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE BAMS UAS 
1. Introduction 
Congress has shown concern regarding the procurement, investment and O&S 
costs of UAVs over the past 10 years. The concern is that the costs presented do not 
represent the actual expenditures that these UAVs will require to maintain operational 
status and utility. The Air Force Global Hawk is a classic example of the type of issues 
that have caused congressional skepticism. The Global Hawk program has been battered 
by cost overruns, production setbacks and performance issues. “The committee [Senate 
Armed Services Committee] is worried similar costs will show up when the Navy rolls 
out its Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned spy plane, which is a 
derivative of the Global Hawk aircraft” (Bennett, 2011). Consequently, the Air Force 
announced in its 2012 budget that it would reduce the amount of Global Hawk Block 40s 
it would purchase by 50 percent in an effort to reduce costs (Bennett, 2011). This section 
addresses additional cost drivers for the BAMS UAS that may validate Congress’ 
concerns. The additional cost drivers selected are satellite bandwidth costs, ground 
station costs, collection site costs, and risks to the BAMS UAS in an operational or 
training environment. Although these costs were not specifically listed as concerns of 
Congress, they are significant costs that may cause Congress to consider them as 
concerns that should be addressed. These additional costs may present budgetary 
impediments going forward with the BAMS UAS program. 
a. Satellite Bandwidth Cost 
The DoD’s current UAV count exceeds 6,000 aircraft with each one 
providing individual unique capabilities for the end users; some are short range, while 
others are very complex high altitude long endurance (HALE) aircraft. However, most 
share the common need for satellite bandwidth. The DoD plan is to have 730 more 
medium to large-sized UAVs by 2020 (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2011). 
Within DoD, the Navy plans to purchase just over 30 BAMS UAS by 2020.  
The number of operational UAVs directly affects satellite bandwidth 
costs. These costs are at times overlooked but can have a dramatic impact on operational 
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sustainment. The BAMS UAS, like the Global Hawk, will rely heavily on the satellite 
bandwidth to transmit necessary time-sensitive information critical to battle groups and 
component commanders. In a net-centric operating environment, the satellite bandwidth 
availability will be increasingly critical to the success of U.S. forces. Over the past 20 
years, satellite bandwidth usage has risen dramatically and costs to the DoD have 
increased as well. However, the amounts of bandwidth and satellite systems in orbit have 
not been able to keep pace with the DoD as the demand for persistent ISR continues to 
increase. This demand for a scarce resource typically translates into higher costs. 
Since the 1980s, the intelligence community has relied on COMSAT to 
augment existing DoD communications systems (Rayermann, 2003–04, pp. 54–66). 
COMSAT provides a variety of DoD services. The demand for COMSAT has increased 
significantly since the 1980 that may be caused by increased demand for information. In 
comparison, during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM in 1991, the total 
satellite communications (SATCOM) bandwidth used by U.S. forces was 100 Mbps. 
During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, SATCOM bandwidth use increased to 2,400 
Mbps (Rayermann, 2003–04, pp. 54–66). This increase is significant because during 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, the force size was over 50 percent less than in 
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As more UAVs, such as the BAMS UAS 
that require high bandwidth become operational, the demand for SATCOM is expected to 
dramatically increase. Figure 7 shows actual and projected SATCOM needed to support 




Figure 7.   Growth in SATCOM Needed to Support 5,000 Military Members 
The BAMS UAS is a variant of the Global Hawk Block 10. In regards to 
bandwidth usage, the Global Hawk uses 500 megabits per second (Mbps), which is 500 
percent of the total bandwidth consumed by U.S. forces doing OPERATIONS DESERT 
SHIELD/STORM (Ackerman & Shachtman, 2012). Assuming the BAMS UAS will be 
just as or more sophisticated as the Global Hawk, it is possible to estimate that the BAMS 
UAS will require at least 500 Mbps while operating. This number is a conservative 
estimate. Previous thesis work showed that 45 Mbps is sufficient for 500 DoD military 
and civilian personnel (Lim, 2007). If this estimation were correct, one BAMS UAS will 
require enough bandwidth to support 5,500 military personnel and the BAMS fleet, if 
simultaneously deployed would require a total of 7,500 Mbps considering three BAMS 
UAS are in flight from each of the five notional bases. The DoD has spent an average of 
$350 million per year for SATCOM and with the implementation of the BAMS UAS 
alongside the Air Force existing Global Hawk fleet, expenditures for SATCOM will 
steadily increase, which will validate Congressional concerns. Table 10 provides a cost 
estimate for satellite usage for the BAMS UAS based upon the average cost from satellite 
service providers in the United States, the assumed BAMS UAS requirement of 500 
Mbps, and the flight hours in accordance with the December 2011 BAMS UAS Selected 
Acquisition Report. Costs were based upon total flight hours for the fiscal year divided 
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by the average number of hours in a month (720 hours), multiplied the average cost every 
month for 100 Mbps multiplied by five to account for the 500 Mbps. 
 
Fiscal Year Number of BAMS Tot. Flight Hours Costs 
FY14 3   8,133 $   41,767 
FY15 7 18,977 $   97,296 
FY16 11 29,821 $ 153,196 
FY17 16 43,376 $ 222,858 
FY18 21 56,931 $ 292,519 
FY19 27 73,197 $ 376,091 
FY20 33 89,463 $ 459,663 
Grand Total  319,898 $ 1,643,390 
Table 10.   BAMS UAS Satellite Cost FY14–20. 
b. BAMS UAS Ground Station Costs 
The infrastructure for the BAMS UAS basing is not complete. The Navy 
has decided on five notional bases discussed in Chapter I and has completed contracts for 
the BAMS UAS training facility in Jacksonville, FL. Assuming the Navy will use the Air 
Force as a model with minimal deviations, the Navy will need to redesign the five 
notional facilities to accommodate the complexity of the BAMS UAS. The Air Force is 
set to spend $200 million on ground station architecture and an additional $115 million 
on communications architecture at each of the bases where the Global Hawk is located 
(Fox, Kodzwa, Tate, & Bronson, 2011). If the Navy has similar requirements, it will 
incur an estimated $1.26 billion cost associated with the redesign of the five notional 
bases. Table 11 displays the average cost at each facility. 
 






Marine Corps Base Hawaii Kaneohe $ 200,000,000 $ 115,000,000 
Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL $ 200,000,000 $ 115,000,000 
Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy $ 200,000,000 $ 115,000,000 
Naval Air Station Kadena, Japan $ 200,000,000 $ 115,000,000 
Total $ 800,000,000 $ 460,000,000 
Table 11.   Notional BAMS UAS Facility Redesign Costs 
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c. Collection Site Manning Costs 
Manning documents from previous research does not account for required 
intelligence analysts needed to analyze the time-sensitive information that the BAMS 
UAS will require. Considering that the BAMS UAS will maintain 24-hour global 
coverage, this thesis assumes that analysts will be placed at national collection sites (the 
four major sites in Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, and Texas) that represent their respective 
areas of operation. This thesis places these analysts at these four sites because the typical 
ISR squadron only has an intelligence division of four personnel (one Officer, three 
Enlisted). Other assumptions made are that the watch floor will be manned 24/7, each 
watch will have an Officer (at least an O-2) as the lead watch officer, a senior enlisted (E-
7) as the assistant watch officer, and each watch section will be comprised of 35 watch 
personnel. The analysts will stand three, eight-hour shifts. This thesis addresses the 
minimum personnel needed to accommodate this watch for a 24-hour period. Table 12 
describes the watch floor personnel and the additional composite cost for manning the 
watch floor for one of the four sites. Tables 13 and 14 display the FY11 DoD composite 
costs. 
 
Billet Title Grade Officer Enlisted Composite Cost 
Watch Officer O-2 3  $    320,991 
Asst. Watch Officer E-7  3 $    324,876 
Intelligence Analysts E-6  9 $    827,109 
Intelligence Analysts E-5  60 $ 4,582,860 
Intelligence Analysts E-4  30 $ 1,889,880 
Total per year  3 102 $ 7,945,716 












Military Pay Grade Composite Cost
O-10 $ 298,240 
O-9 $ 295,409 
O-8 $ 275,574 
O-7 $ 245,980 
O-6 $ 232,064 
O-5 $ 193,920 
O-4 $ 166,273 
O-3 $ 132,959 
O-2 $ 106,997 
O-1 $   85,616 
WO-5 $ 191,550 
WO-4 $ 162,748 
WO-3 $ 139,175 
WO-2 $ 117,717 
WO-1 $ 103,267 
Table 13.   DoD Officer Composite Cost 
Military Pay Grade Composite Cost 
E-9 $ 148,501  
E-8 $ 122,739  
E-7 $ 108,292  
E-6 $   91,901  
E-5 $   76,381  
E-4 $   62,996  
E-3 $   54,193  
E-2 $   49,812  
E-1 $   45,041  
Table 14.   DoD Enlisted Composite Cost 
d. BAMS UAS Risks 
“The threats to aircraft have been defined as those elements of a man-
made environment designed to reduce the ability of an aircraft to perform mission-related 
functions by inflicting damaging effects, forcing undesirable maneuvers, or degrading 
system effectiveness” (Nguyen, 2002). Future operations will most likely see a greater 
reliance on UAVs, which will cause these vehicles to conduct operations on the frontlines 
of those operations closer to adversarial threats. On December 7, 2011, the world was 
notified that a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel crashed in Iranian territory near the town of 
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Kashmar, just over 100 miles from the Afghan border (Shane & Sanger, 2011). The 
political response from both countries was minimal. The Iranian MP Esmaeil Kowsari 
stated that had it been a fighter jet vice a UAV, Iran would have carried out a military 
response, which shows Irans’ the lack of concern for UAVs and view towards manned 
fighter jets. Six months later in Dorchester County, MD, a BAMS UAS crashed (Naval 
Air Systems Command, 2012b). Again, the political response within the United States 
was minimal. Hence, if the reaction to UAV losses whether on a mission or during 
training does not generate the same responses as losses to manned aircraft, a possibility 
exists that other countries may be less reluctant to shoot down a U.S. UAV as the 
political implications may have little or no effect. 
Iran may not be considered a sophisticated potential adversary at this time. 
However, the likes of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are very 
different. Those countries may possess the ability to shoot down the BAMS UAS, deny 
GPS, and manipulate SATCOM feeds that would have far-reaching effects to the 
program due to losses of the UAS and its mission capabilities. Currently, the aircraft 
along with its associated systems, cost $220 million (Department of Defense, 2011a). 
Losing several of these UAVs could cost the program over a billion dollars when the loss 
and replacement costs are considered. Assuming that the BAMS UAS will have the same 
mishap/accident rate as the Global Hawk, the BAMS UAS program is set to incur 9.31 
accidents or mishaps every 100,000-flight hours (McGarry, 2012). Using this accident 
rate coupled with possible reactions by adversaries showing minimal regard to the U.S. 
UAVs flying over or along the coast of their countries, the program may have issues 
providing 24-hour global surveillance. For the years evaluated in this thesis, the BAMS 
UAS will have an estimated 319,898 flight hours. This thesis estimates that between 
FY14 and FY20, at least two BAMS UAS will be lost during training and operations. and 
these aircraft will be replaced, which will cause the program an estimated $880 million in 
losses and replacement.  
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C. SUMMARY  
The revised O&S cost estimation in Tables 3 through 9 include the assumptions 
and constraints explained in the previous chapter and form the basis for comparison to the 
Navy’s BAMS decision. The tables do not reflect decisions by naval leadership to 
decrease or increase manning, specific system upgrades or changes the maintenance, or 
collection systems. Furthermore, events, such as a surge to quell an uprising that may 
cause an increase in flight hours, and maintenance directly resulting in increased 
spending, are not factored into the estimate. However, according to the cost estimate 
provided, the BAMS UAS O&S costs from FY14 to FY20 increased by an average of 53 
percent each year. With all cost estimations, inaccuracies are expected. For this 
comparison, these estimates are reasonable approximations for consideration.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF O&S COSTS FOR THE EP-3E AND THE 
BAMS UAS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this section, the analysis of the revised O&S costs for the EP-3E and the 
BAMS UAS from FY14 to FY20 are based upon manpower, operations, maintenance, 
system support and improvements, and the additional applied costs (satellite costs, 
ground station costs, collection site personnel costs and aircraft risk costs). The thesis 
calculated approximate values for both platforms (shown in Chapter III), to give the 
reader a comprehensive look at the O&S costs for the years compared. These years were 
chosen because both platforms will be in service during this time. This analysis is 
important because O&S cost contribute greatly to the overall life cycle costs of aircraft 
systems. Acquisitions costs receive considerable attention but O&S costs typically 
outweigh them over the life of the system. Figure 8 provides an illustration describing the 
balance between the cost processes. The revised O&S cost estimate included the 
additional cost listed above because these additional costs associated with the BAMS 
UAS validate Congressional concern associated with the life-cycle costs of the system. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the BAMS UAS is one-third of an $8 billion dollar investment of 
three UAVs that will replace the EP-3E. The BAMS UAS obligates nearly half of the $8 
billion investment, and based upon this research, will cost $1.6 billion more than the EP-




Figure 8.   Total Ownership Cost  
B. O&S COST COMPARISON 
1. Unit-level Manpower Comparison 
Unit-level manpower consists of operations, maintenance and other unit support 
manpower costs. These costs encompass direct costs associated with the unit. They 
include pilots, navigators, mission specialist, unit-level maintenance personnel (military 
and civilian), administrative staff, security, and logistics and ordinance support 
(Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). The unit-level manpower cost 







1.0 Unit Level Manpower EP-3E BAMS UAS 
FY14 $   75,683,126 $   3,615,135 
FY15 $   81,329,088 $   8,435,315 
FY16 $   87,396,237 $ 13,255,495 
FY17 $   93,915,997 $ 19,280,720 
FY18 $ 100,922,130 $ 25,305,945 
FY19 $ 108,450,921 $ 32,536,215 
FY20 $ 116,541,360 $   39,766,485 
Total ($FY11 Millions) $ 664,238,859 $ 142,195,310 
Table 15.   Unit-Level Manpower Cost Comparison 
2. Unit Operations Comparison 
Unit operations includes all costs, such as fuel, electricity, expendables stores, 
munitions for training and other materials consumed at the unit level attributed to 
operations (Operating and Support Cost-Estimation Guide, 2007). The unit operations 
costs comparison is shown in Table 16. 
 
2.0 Unit Operations EP-3E BAMS UAS 
FY14 $   52,133,010 $     30,051,435  
FY15 $   61,120,741 $     70,120,015  
FY16 $   62,174,462 $   110,188,595  
FY17 $   72,893,340 $   160,274,320  
FY18 $   85,460,152 $   210,360,045  
FY19 $   86,933,485 $   270,462,915  
FY20 $   88,432,218 $   330,565,785  
Total ($FY11 Millions) $ 509,147,408 $ 1,182,023,110  
Table 16.   Unit Operations Cost Comparison 
3. Maintenance Comparison 
Maintenance costs include all levels of maintenance associated with the primary 
system, simulators, training devices, and associated support equipment. The maintenance 





3.0 Maintenance EP-3E BAMS UAS 
FY14 $   70,487,634 $   15,051  
FY15 $   70,558,121 $   35,119  
FY16 $   70,628,680 $   55,187  
FY17 $   84,754,416 $   80,272  
FY18 $   84,771,366 $ 105,357  
FY19 $   86,466,794 $ 135,459  
FY20 $   88,196,130 $ 165,561  
Total ($FY11 Millions) $ 555,863,141 $ 592,006  
Table 17.   Maintenance Cost Comparison 
4. Sustaining Support Comparison 
Sustaining support specifically applies to the costs of training incoming personnel 
who will replace personnel who have reached their rotation date. Included in these costs 
are the cost of instructors, training devices, course material, per diem, and travel. The 
sustaining support comparison is shown in Table 18. 
 
4.0 Sustaining Support EP-3E BAMS UAS 
FY14 $   11,960,755 $    458,469  
FY15 $   14,403,142 $ 1,069,761  
FY16 $   17,344,263 $ 1,681,053  
FY17 $   20,885,962 $ 2,455,168  
FY18 $   25,150,875 $ 3,209,283  
FY19 $   30,286,684 $ 4,126,221  
FY20 $   36,471,224 $ 5,043,159  
Total ($FY11 Millions) $ 156,502,905 $ 5,960,097  
Table 18.   Sustaining Support Cost Comparison 
5. Continuing System Improvements Comparison 
Continuing support applies to software and hardware replacements and upgrades 
that a system may undergo after deployment to enhance performance and sustainability. 





5.0 Continuing System Improvements EP-3E BAMS UAS 
FY14 $ 114,548,211 $ 16,600,716  
FY15 $ 115,638,568 $ 38,735,004  
FY16 $ 92,510,855  $ 60,869,292  
FY17 $ 78,634,226  $ 88,537,152  
FY18 $ 66,839,092  $ 116,205,012  
FY19 $ 56,813,228  $ 149,406,444  
FY20 $ 48,291,244  $ 182,607,876  
Total ($FY11 Millions) $ 603,275,424 $ 652,961,496  
Table 19.   Continuing System Improvements Cost Comparison 
C. SUMMARY 
The cost estimate comparison was separated by unit-level manpower, unit 
operations, maintenance, sustaining support, and continuing system improvements. 
Tables 11 through 15 provide the cost comparison. The EP-3E, according to the 
calculated estimate, cost $505,295,718 more than the BAMS UAS FY14 through FY20 
for unit-level manpower. This number supports the assumptions made in Chapter II. The 
BAMS UAS unit operations costs exceeded the EP-3E unit operations by $672,875,702. 
This cost difference is attributed to the flight hours associated with the BAMS UAS and 
the minimum number of aircraft needed to cover an operating area. The maintenance 
costs of the EP-3E severely outweighed those of the BAMS UAS. The EP-3Es 
maintenance cost exceed those of the BAMS UAS by $555,271,135. This number may be 
attributed to the fact that by FY20, the EP-3E would have over 40 years of service and 
maintenance costs would be expected to be significantly high. Sustaining support again 
was outweighed by the EP-3E. The EP-3E sustaining support costs exceeded those of the 
BAMS UAS by $150,542,808. Based on the cost trend, the sustaining support costs of the 
BAMS UAS are expected to dramatically increase as more systems become operational. 
Lastly, the BAMS UAS continuing system improvement costs outweighed those of the 
EP-3E by $49,686,072. These costs are expected to continually increase for the BAMS 
UAS due to system modifications and upgrades as the operational and threat 
environments change. Simply looking at the O&S cost estimate, the EP-3E program cost 
an estimated $505,295,718 more than the BAMS UAS. However, once the additional 
costs, costs that should be of concern for Congress of satellite bandwidth costs, ground 
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station building costs, collection site personnel costs, and costs that may be attributed to 
the loss and replacement of two BAMS UAS between FY14 and FY20, the cost of the 
BAMS UAS outweigh the EP-3 by more than $1.6 billion. Table 20 displays all 
calculated costs. 
 
Overall Cost Comparison EP-3 BAMS UAS 
Unit-Level Manpower $ 664,238,859 $ 142,195,310 
Unit-Operations $ 509,147,408 $ 1,182,023,110 
Maintenance $ 555,863,141 $ 592,006 
Sustaining Support $ 156,502,905 $ 5,960,097 
Continuing System Improvements $ 603,275,424 $ 652,961,496 
BAMS UAS ADDITIONAL COSTS 
Satellite   $ 1,643,390 
Ground Stations Redesign   $ 1,260,000,000 
Collection Site Personnel  $ 31,782,864 
Risks and Accidents   $ 880,000,000 
Total $ 2,489,027,737 $ 4,157,158,273 
Difference  $ 1,668,130,536 
Table 20.   Overall Cost Comparison 
Overall, through the years compared, the EP-3E is a more efficient platform to 
employ, and the additional costs associated with the BAMS UAS are reason for concern 
and should be considered by Congress. Additionally, the costs associated with the BAMS 
UAS can be expected to continue to increase as more systems are added to the Navy’s 
inventory between FY21–40. These costs were aggregate cost estimations based upon 
educated assumptions, cost trends, historical data from the VAMOSC database, and 
multipliers (calculated based upon the historical data).  
An additional consideration for the BAMS UAS program is to delay the 
acquisition and operation of the program for another five to six years by keeping the EP-
3E fully operational through FY20. This delay will permit the Navy to take advantage of 
technology advances, the rapid improvements in reliability, and reductions in cost 
associated with the explosion in UAS technologies, as well as also allow for the 
deployment of more efficient and cost effective satellite systems that would also lower 
O&S cost that the Navy will incur. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research was to examine, compare and analyze the O&S costs 
for both the EP-3E ISR aircraft and the BAMS UAS. This comparison included all costs 
from initial system deployment through the end of the platforms’ service life. This thesis 
used a revised O&S cost methodology in accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.2, 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. Chapter II covered the DoD O&S cost 
estimation process to establish the necessary background to understand the purpose of the 
cost estimation process. Chapter III developed an O&S cost estimation for the BAMS 
UAS based upon the EP-3E (closet analogous manned aircraft in which it is replacing) 
O&S historical data from the VAMOSC database. Chapter III also developed cost 
estimations for the additional cost analyzed in this research. Chapter IV analyzed 
modified the O&S data for comparison between the EP-3E and the BAM UAS. The cost 
estimates presented in Chapter IV validate Congressional concern in regards to the 
BAMS UAS program. The additional cost drivers proved to create significant increased 
costs that need to be placed in future budgets to mitigate the risk of future budget 
shortfalls. Additionally, Congress should revisit the BAMS UAS program in an effort to 
identify more efficient ways to implement the program and reduce costs. Joint 
investments with the Air Force may provide a solution to mitigate several of the 
additional cost identified in this thesis. This chapter provides answers to the research 
questions and suggest topics for further research. 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
 What Are the Major Factors Driving the Cost Differences Between 
the EP-3E and the BAMS UAS and Why? 
Unit-level manpower, unit operations and maintenance costs were the three major 
cost factors between the two systems for the years compared in this thesis. In a one-to-
one comparison between squadron sizes, an EP-3E squadron is 32 percent larger than a 
proposed BAMS UAS squadron. The actual manning document from PMA-262 is not 
available due to privacy reasons and program concerns but previous research suggest that 
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168 personnel would be the closest estimate. This 32-percent size difference was the 
major contributing factor for the EP-3E unit-level manpower costs outweighing those of 
the BAMS UAS so significantly. Unit operations that include fuel cost were a major cost 
driver that separated the two systems. As discussed in the assumptions section of Chapter 
II, the BAMS UAS will maintain 24-hour global coverage that will require a minimum of 
three BAMS from each of the five notional bases to be airborne in their assigned 
operating areas at all times. Although the BAMS UAS is a single engine aircraft, the 
length of its missions and continued coverage severely increased fuel costs for the 
system. The other major cost factor was maintenance costs. As described in the 
assumptions prior to the cost estimations, it is assumed that the aging EP-3E will require 
much more significant maintenance per flight hour than the BAMS UAS to remain 
mission ready. The EP-3E service life expands over 30 years and by FY20, 40 years. The 
additional costs that were the cost drivers for this thesis caused the BAMS UAS to be 
more expensive. Building redesign and losses to the BAMS UAS program due to 
adversaries and accident rate were the major cost drivers within the additional cost. 
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
 What Are the Differences in the O&S Cost of the EP-3E and BAMS? 
The two systems were compared from FY14 through FY20. Due to the additional 
costs implemented in the calculations, the EP-3E is the more cost effective platform to 
operate during the time period analyzed. These additional costs are important when 
considering future budgets for the BAMS UAS program. The addition of more BAMS 
UAS aircraft for the fiscal years going forward will continue and add to the costs of 
associated with the BAMS UAS program. More personnel may be needed at each of the 
BAMS UAS bases (due to increased BAMS UAS), and at the collection site to 
accommodate for the amount of BAMS UAS data and live streams that will be down-
linked. In addition to personnel costs, maintenance and fuel costs should also increase as 
more systems become operational. By FY40, the O&S costs of the EP-3E program will 
be minimal to those of the BAMS UAS, and possibly beyond comparison. As discussed 
in previous chapters, cost estimations are not without error and the actual historical data 
eventually be provided to VAMOSC may be slightly different. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 What is the Satellite and Bandwidth Cost Implications of the BAMS 
UAS from FY21 to FY40. How Many More Satellites Will Be 
Required to Handle the Bandwidth Requirement of the BAMS UAS? 
Bandwidth costs rise with increased UAV usage, and increases in demand are 
typically followed by increases in cost. The demand for satellite support is not only 
affected by the DoD but from the civilian sector as well. The demand for data by ground 
units has steadily increased since the beginning of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM AND 
ENDURING FREEDOM. Much of that burden is placed upon UAVs that require the use 
of satellites to forward most of the data they gather, and especially full motion video. By 
FY40, an estimated 65 BAMS UAS will be owned by the Navy, and the Air Force is set 
to have a comparable amount of Global Hawks as well. The increased satellite usage of 
these UAVs will have a dramatic effect on the costs of satellites and associated systems. 
 How Many More Satellites Constellations Will Be Required to Handle 
the Bandwidth Requirement of the BAMS UAS? 
In a phone conversation with a VIASAT engineering manager, Paul Cramer, the 
company recently launched a new 140 gigabyte Ka COMSAT that will support the 
increased bandwidth demand of the DoD. The satellite cost an estimated $400 million to 
design and another $500 million to launch. If demand for bandwidth continues at the 
current rate, how many more of these satellites will be needed to provide the coverage 
needed by DoD personnel and systems? 
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